# Step 25 — Security and Backup Review — Implementation Report

**Status:** COMPLETED  
**Verified:** 12 August 2026  
**Pull request:** #37

## Overview

Step 25 performs the roadmap security review across authentication, password storage, authorization, branch isolation, 2FA, login monitoring, sessions, private uploads/documents, CSRF, rate limiting, validation, injection resistance, audit logs and financial transaction protection. It also adds verified database/private-file backup commands and a documented restore procedure.

The work preserves the finance-domain protections from Steps 1–24. No financial formula, loan balance, payment allocation, branch permission or posting rule was weakened.

## Security review matrix

### Authentication — VERIFIED AND HARDENED

- Laravel email/username authentication and active-account checks remain the password gate.
- Successful login regenerates the session; logout invalidates it and regenerates the CSRF token.
- Credential/IP rate limiting and permanent login-attempt history were added.
- Password-reset requests return a generic response to prevent account enumeration.
- Successful password reset rotates the remember token and revokes stored database sessions.

### Password hashing — VERIFIED

- `User` continues to use Laravel's `hashed` password cast.
- Password reset continues to use Laravel hashing and the password broker.
- Step 25 never stores/logs plaintext passwords.

### Authorization and branch isolation — VERIFIED

- Existing permission middleware remains on protected operational/admin routes.
- Existing `canAccessBranch()` plus controller/service branch scoping remain unchanged.
- All prior branch-isolation regressions remain green.
- Step 25 adds no cross-branch data route.

### 2FA — IMPLEMENTED

- Dependency-free RFC 6238-compatible TOTP: SHA-1, 6 digits, 30-second periods.
- TOTP secrets use Laravel encrypted casts.
- Confirmed 2FA prevents password-only application authentication; the user remains guest-state until the second factor passes.
- Recovery codes are shown only when generated, normalized, SHA-256 hashed, stored inside an encrypted array and consumed once under a database row lock.
- Users can enable, confirm, disable and regenerate recovery codes from the compact Security page with current-password confirmation where appropriate.

### Login monitoring — IMPLEMENTED

- Indexed `login_attempts` history stores user when known, bounded identifier, status, IP, user agent and timestamp.
- Records failed credentials, inactive accounts, throttling, 2FA-required transitions, failed 2FA, TOTP success and recovery-code success.
- Users can view their recent sign-in activity.

### Session/browser security — HARDENED

- Session encryption defaults on.
- Cookies remain HTTP-only, SameSite defaults to `strict`, and secure cookies default on in production.
- Login/2FA regenerate session IDs; password reset revokes stored sessions.
- Global web middleware emits `nosniff`, `DENY` framing, strict referrer policy, restrictive permissions policy, same-origin opener policy and a restrictive CSP compatible with the current Blade UI.
- HSTS is emitted only for production HTTPS.

### File upload and sensitive-document security — VERIFIED AND HARDENED

Existing workflow-specific validation remains. `SecureFileService` adds a centralized defensive layer:

- Reject invalid uploads and private paths containing traversal/null-byte patterns.
- Enforce a 25 MB absolute private-upload ceiling.
- Reject executable/script/web-content extensions and dangerous detected MIME types.
- Continue private-disk storage with Laravel-generated stored names.
- Private downloads explicitly use `private, no-store` caching and `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.
- Existing document routes still enforce module permission plus branch/business ownership.
- Private documents remain under `storage/app/private`, not a public disk.

### CSRF, rate limiting and input validation — VERIFIED/HARDENED

- Laravel's normal `web` CSRF middleware remains enabled; Step 25 adds no exemption or state-changing GET route.
- Existing login/reset route throttles remain; specialized login and 2FA limits were added.
- Controllers continue Laravel request validation and finance/domain services continue authoritative recalculation and validation.

### SQL/injection protection — VERIFIED

- Application data access continues through Eloquent/query-builder parameter binding.
- Step 25 includes an injection-shaped login identifier regression and confirms no authentication bypass.
- The SQLite backup serializer only quotes trusted schema identifiers discovered from SQLite metadata and quotes data values through PDO.

### Audit logs — VERIFIED AND EXTENDED

- Existing `AuditService` remains the permanent authenticated business-event trail.
- Step 25 adds events for 2FA setup/enable/disable/recovery regeneration, successful second-factor verification and password-reset/session revocation.
- Failed/unauthenticated login events are retained in the dedicated login-attempt history.

### Financial transaction protection — VERIFIED

- Existing database transactions, maker-checker controls, immutable/permanent records, balance revalidation, duplicate-posting guards and confirmed-closing closed-book controls remain intact.
- Step 25 creates no financial transaction.
- The complete Steps 1–24 financial regression suite remains green after hardening.

## Backup procedure

Step 25 adds:

```bash
php artisan security:backup
php artisan security:backup-verify /path/to/backup-bundle
```

### Database

- SQLite: logical SQL dump containing schema, all data and applicable indexes/triggers/views.
- MySQL/MariaDB: `mysqldump` using single-transaction, routines, triggers and events.
- MySQL password is supplied to the process environment rather than command-line arguments.
- Database dump byte size and SHA-256 are recorded.

### Private documents

The backup copies the **entire configured private storage tree**, covering current/future private attachments including customer/KYC documents, scanned IDs, loan contracts/signed contracts/documents, collateral photos/files, expense receipts, financial/write-off evidence and private business logo/stamp assets.

On-demand receipts, statements, disbursement receipts and payslips are recoverable from permanent database source records; persisted private files are copied directly.

### Integrity and retention

Every bundle contains `database.sql`, `private/` and `manifest.json`. The manifest stores database and per-file SHA-256/byte metadata.

The service:

- Requires `BACKUP_PATH` outside the private storage root.
- Verifies every database/private file before declaring success.
- Deletes incomplete bundles on failure.
- Prunes expired bundles only after a new bundle verifies.
- Detects missing/resized/modified files and unsafe manifest paths during independent verification.
- Supports an optional non-overlapping daily Laravel schedule with configurable retention/time.

Production should replicate verified bundles to encrypted, access-controlled off-host storage; vendor/cloud credentials are intentionally not embedded in application code.

## Restore procedure

Detailed recovery instructions are in:

`docs/SECURITY_BACKUP_RESTORE_RUNBOOK.md`

The runbook covers secure escrow of the original `APP_KEY`/credentials, checksum verification, maintenance mode/writer suspension, SQLite and MySQL/MariaDB restore, complete private-tree restore, restrictive permissions, cache clearing, 2FA/private-document smoke checks and financial reconciliation before reopening operations. It also specifies periodic isolated restore drills.

## Database changes

Migration:

`2026_08_12_210000_add_security_monitoring_and_two_factor.php`

It adds encrypted 2FA storage columns to `users` and creates indexed `login_attempts`. No financial schema changed.

## Main additions

- `app/Console/Commands/SecurityBackupCommand.php`
- `app/Console/Commands/VerifySecurityBackupCommand.php`
- `app/Http/Controllers/Auth/TwoFactorChallengeController.php`
- `app/Http/Controllers/SecuritySettingsController.php`
- `app/Http/Middleware/SecurityHeaders.php`
- `app/Models/LoginAttempt.php`
- `app/Services/BackupService.php`
- `app/Services/LoginAttemptService.php`
- `app/Services/TotpService.php`
- `config/backups.php`
- `database/migrations/2026_08_12_210000_add_security_monitoring_and_two_factor.php`
- `routes/security.php`
- `resources/views/auth/two-factor-challenge.blade.php`
- `resources/views/security/show.blade.php`
- `docs/SECURITY_BACKUP_RESTORE_RUNBOOK.md`
- `tests/Feature/SecurityBackupReviewTest.php`

Important hardened files include `AuthenticatedSessionController`, password-reset controllers, `User`, `SecureFileService`, `bootstrap/app.php`, `config/session.php`, `.env.example`, console/web routes and topbar navigation.

## Automated verification

Step 25 adds 8 focused tests covering encrypted TOTP setup, password-only blocking, one-time recovery codes, login monitoring/injection-shaped input, browser/session hardening, hostile-upload rejection, private download caching, complete backup/tamper detection, password-reset session revocation, command registration and Security UI/navigation.

### Source implementation gate

Head `427825a4ff7fdbd75e79145a2368f368b70865b1`, CI run `31599172490`:

- Fresh migrations: PASS
- All seeders: PASS
- Step 25 tests: **8 passed**
- Full suite: **179 passed**
- Assertions: **1,921**
- Steps 1–24 regressions: PASS

### Documentation-inclusive gate

Head `d22a56745b76b2dd22f00799b4075b1753813cfd`, CI run `31599525571`:

- Fresh migrations: PASS
- All seeders: PASS
- Step 25 tests: **8 passed**
- Full suite: **179 passed**
- Assertions: **1,921**
- Steps 1–24 regressions: PASS

This status-only documentation commit is the final branch change. It must pass one last exact-head CI run before PR #37 is merged; no subsequent source or documentation changes are permitted without restarting that gate.

## Remaining Step 25 work

None. Merge is gated only on the final exact-head verification of this status commit.

## Next roadmap module

**Step 26 — Complete Integration Test**.
